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Titulo de articulo: QUANTIFYING INSURANCE TERRORISM RISK
Fecha de creacion:
01/30/2012
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01/30/2012
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QUANTIFYING INSURANCE TERRORISM RISK

By Dr. Gordon Woo
Risk Management Solutions
Gordon.Woo@rms.com
Prepared for the National Bureau of Economic Research meeting,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1 February 2002

ABSTRACT
The World Trade Center disaster was a stark reminder to the insurance industry of the potential dire consequences of accumulating high concentrations of insured value and underestimating a hazard to which they are exposed. By imposing strict coverage limits, or stopping to offer terrorism cover for large commercial policies, initial steps can be taken to address the accumulation problem. Subsequently, exploration of the impact of some hypothetical future terrorist scenarios can guide the control of risk accumulations.
But estimating Probable Maximum Loss, as well as the pricing of terrorism risk, require the hazard issue also to be addressed. This will never be resolved as well as hurricane or earthquake hazard, but some insight into its ranking as a peril is urgently needed. With the insurance industry struggling with the uncertainty of how to deal with terrorism risks, hopes will be placed on a reduction of the terrorist threat, now that there is a concerted global will to combat terrorism. Terrorism hazard is considered here in the wake of this international governmental resolution, and the destruction of the al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan. The frequency and severity of attacks depend crucially on organizational structure. To minimize detection by counter-terrorist forces, advantage may be taken by terrorists of alternative forms of network architecture, adopted by drugs syndicates, pirates, and other criminals, within which sporadic pulsing swarm attacks might be effectively launched.
The constraints of this network architecture, with sustained pressure from counter-terrorist forces, will influence the relative likelihood of different scenarios favored by al-Qaeda. A terrorism cost function, involving planning time, technical difficulty, and consumption of resources, may be defined to quantify relative scenario likelihood, and thereby allow a loss severity curve to be derived. As part of the task of normalizing this curve to strike frequency, a logical event-tree is outlined for computing the probability that a planned attack is successful. Any probabilistic framework for quantifying terrorism risk, however logically designed, will ultimately have to involve a measure of expert judgement. Extensive expert consultation exercises have already been commissioned by the Pentagon, and should prove as insightful to the insurance industry as for government agencies.
Introduction
On September 11th 2001, the world-wide insurance community suffered its worst ever loss. The shock of such an enormous loss was compounded by the realization that this was a loss stemming from a risk which was accepted, but not quantified. Underwriters were as surprised as civic authorities and security agents. Rough calculations on risk exposure may have been made on the basis of past claims. But, as with all low frequency, high severity perils, whether natural or man-made, a rudimentary actuarial approach to risk quantification, based upon historical loss experience data, is inadequate for a variety of reasons: in particular, the questionable relevance of much of the historical record, and the disparity between its short length and the return period of extreme events.
Every catastrophic loss teaches a hard lesson in risk management: to underwrite a catastrophe peril ignorant of the scale of the risk is to invite further financial trouble. Where catastrophe risks are underwritten, a diligent attempt should be made to quantify them, challenging though this task may be. The major property insurance losses of recent times, such as Hurricane Andrew and the Northridge earthquake, have not merely been outlying statistics on a loss experience plot, they have propelled forward methodological advances in risk modeling. Terrorism cover will continue to be provided after 2001, and from Ground Zero will have to rise up quantitative methods for modeling terrorism risk.
This paper addresses the challenge of quantifying terrorism risk. The classic definition of risk is that it is a product of hazard and vulnerability. The second factor deals with the loss inflicted if a specific terrorist scenario were to occur. Such a scenario might involve the crash of a plane into an urban area, a city bomb blast, a harbor LNG ship explosion, detonation of a nuclear device, etc.. Modeling a specific scenario is essentially a complex engineering problem, not dissimilar, in principle, to the scenario analysis conducted for natural perils such as windstorms and earthquakes. Given the dynamics of the energy source and the geometry of energy dissipation, the vulnerability of engineering construction of different types may be evaluated. Modeling studies of various hypothetical terrorist scenarios are in progress.
For natural perils, hazard modeling may be technically and computationally demanding, but modelers can take comfort from Einstein’s dictum that ‘Nature may be subtle, but is not malicious’. Terrorists, on the other hand, are both subtle and malicious. So how can a hazard model for terrorism be developed? Obviously, a different approach is required to the traditional reductionist bottom-up approach used for modeling the inanimate world of engineering physics.
A RAND suggestion (Ronfeldt et al., 2001a) is to focus on the network behavior of a terrorist organization, and its capacity to wage a netwar. A theoretical framework for this modern mode of conflict does exist, based on the principles of complexity (see e.g. Waldrop, 1992), which shows how key features of the organizational structure of complex interacting systems emerge. This theory has been successful over the past decade in pioneering quantitative understanding of many aspects of the social behavior of biological organisms. Doubtless as oblivious of the finer mathematical points of
complexity theory are the seasoned netwar practioners among the criminal fraternity; drugs, immigration, and smuggling racketeers. It is a basic tenet of complexity theory that network characteristics are not consciously moulded by its components, but rather emerge spontaneously from their individual actions.
In applying the broad ideas of complexity theory to the sociological context, account must be taken of human factors such as intelligence and social interaction. As sociologists have remarked (Kennedy et al., 2001), through learning from experience and emulating the successful behavior of others, people are able to discover relatively optimal patterns of attitudes, beliefs and behaviors. For social groups, in which individuals learn from, emulate, and adapt to other group members, there is thus a collective intelligence, which is geographically distributed. This collective dispersed intelligence is a prime facet of terrorist organizations; a hydra-like feature which makes them inherently more threatening , powerful and evasive than lone terrorists.
The concept of swarm intelligence has been developed to describe populations which exhibit certain basic collective patterns of behavior, arising not so much from leadership direction, but rather emerging from the actions of individual members. The social insect metaphor has been a powerful tool in exploring some crucial characteristics of social organizations, including flexibility, robustness, distributed functioning and autonomy.
Although originally developed in the context of cellular robotic systems, the foremost paradigm for swarm intelligence is that of the ant colony, which has the remarkable capability of collectively arriving at solutions to almost intractable mathematical problems (Bonabeau et al., 1999). Edward Wilson’s deep fascination with the way that the mass organized behavior of ant populations may be understood from single ant behavior drew him towards a theory of sociobiology (Wilson, 1975). Of course, ants are not human beings. Ants are genetically programmed to dedicate themselves to their pre-assigned tasks; to kill and be killed rather like automatons; to be as prepared to die for the colony as to live.
If the ideas of swarm intelligence are applicable to any group of human beings, it would be to zealous and fanatical terrorists, bound together as one by the Islamic bond of brotherhood; as absolute as that shared by blood relatives. Such a terrorist group could not be adequately represented simply as a set of single-minded individuals, espousing a common cause. Much of their special strength resides in the unusual qualities of their collective swarm intelligence, which govern the group’s fearsome capability of executing extreme acts of terror and escaping prior detection. Accordingly, in order to understand the nature of terrorism hazard: its spatial and temporal characteristics, the frequency and severity of attacks; it is necessary to comprehend the structure of terrorist organizations.





KVANTIFIKOVANJE OSIGURANJA RIZIKA TERORIZMA

Dr Gordon Vu
Menadžment Rešenja Rizika
Gordon.Woo@rms.com

Pripremljeno za sastanak Nacionalnog biroa za Nacionalna Istraživanja
Kembridž, Masačusets, 1 Februar 2002


REZIME

Katastrofa u Svetskom Trgovinskom Centru je bila žestok podsetnik za industriju osiguranja od potencijalno kobnih konsekvenci akumulacije visokih koncentracija osiguranih vrednosti i podcenjivanja opasnosti kojima su bili izloženi. Nametanje stroge pokrivenosti limita, ili zaustavljanje da se ponudi teroristička pokrivenost za velike komercijalne politike, prvi su koraci koji mogu biti preduzeti da se reši problem akumulacije. Nakon toga, istraživanje uticaja nekih hipotetički budućih terorističkih scenarija može voditi kontrolu rizika akumulacije.

Ali procena „verovatnog maksimalnog gubitka“, kao i cena od rizika terorizma zahteva opasnost problem, koji takođe treba da se reši. Ovo nikada neće biti rešeno kao opasnosti uragana ili zemljotresa, ali neki uvid u njegov rang kao opasnost je hitno potrebna. Sa osiguranjem koje se bori sa nesigurnošću kako se nositi sa rizicima terorizma, nade će biti postavljene na redukciju terorističkih pretnji, sada kada postoji globalna usaglašenost za borbu protiv terorizma. Opasnost terorizma je ovde uzeta u obzir nakon ove internacionalne vladine rezolucije i uništavanja Al Kaidinih kampova za obuku terorista. Učestalost i ozbiljnost napada zavisi presudno od organizacione strkture. Da bi smanjilo otkrivanje kontra- terorstičkih snaga, prednost može biti preduzeta od strane terorističkih alternativnih oblika mrežne arhitekture, usvojena od strane sindikata lekova, pirata i drugih kriminalaca, u okviru koje sporadično pulsirajući roj napadi mogu biti efikasno pokrenuti.

Ograničenje ove mrežne arhitekture, sa pretrpelim pritiskom od kontra terorističkih snaga, će uticati na relativne verovatnoće različitih scenarija favorizovanih od strane Al Kaide. Terorizam košta funkciju koja uključuje planiranje vremena, tehniče teškoće i potrošnje resursa, može biti definisana da kvantifikuje relativni scenario verovatnoće i na taj način dozvoli gubitak težine vijuge da bude izvedena. Kao deo zadatka ove vijuge na udaru frkvencije, logičan događaj- drvo je iscrtano za izračunavanje verovatnoće da planirani napad bude uspešan. Bilo koji okvir verovatnoće za izračunavanje za kvantifikovanje rizika terorizma, kako god logično dizajniran, na kraju će morati da uključi mere mišljenja stručnjaka. Opsežna stručna konsultacija za vežbe već je bile naručene od strane Pentagona i trebala se dokazati kao pronicljiva za osiguranje i vladine agencije.

Uvod

Jedanaestog Septembra 2001, svetska zajednica osiguranja pretrpela je najgore gubitke ikada. Šok od jednog takvog ogromnog gubitka bio je sastavljen od strane realizacije da ovo je
gubitak po osnovu rizika koji je prihvaćen, ali ne i kvantifikovan. Pokrovitelji su bili iznenađeni kao civilne vlasti i bezbednosni agenti. Grubi proračuni o izloženosti riziku su dobijeni na osnovu prošlih tvrdnji. Ali kao i sa celom niskom frekvencijom, visokom ozbiljnošću rizika, bilo da su prirodni ili veštački, rudimentarni statisitčki pristup kvantifikovanju rizika, baziran na istorijskim podacima o iskustvu gubitaka, nije dovoljan iz više razloga: pre svega pitanje relevantnosti mnogih istorijskih podataka kao i disparitet između svoje kratke dužine i povratnog perioda ekstremnih događaja.

Svaki katastrofalan gubitak podučava o upravljanju rizicima: osigurati katastrofu opasnosti nepoznatu na skali rizika je da pozove buduće finansijske nevolje. Gde su rizici katastrofe potipsani, marljiv pokušaj trebalo bi da ih kvantifikuje, ovaj zadatak može biti izazovan. Glavni gubitci osigurane imovine u poslednje vreme kao što su uragan Endrju i Nortridž zemljotres, nisu isključivo bili okolni statistički podaci na gubitku iskustva zavere, oni su pogonovani prema metodološkim napredcima u modelovanju rizika. Teroristička pokrivenost će i dalje biti obezbeđena nakon 2001, i od nulte tačke će morati da podiže kvantitativne metode za modelovanje rizika terorizma.

Ovaj rad se bavi izazovom kvantifikovanja rizika terorizma. Klasična definicija terorizma je da to je proizvod opasnosti ranjivosti. Drugi faktor se bavi sa gubitkom nanešenim ako se specifični teroristički scenario već pojavio. Takav scenario može da uključuje pad aviona u gradsko područje, eksploziju bombe u gradu, eksploziju LNG broda, detonaciju nuklearnog oružja, itd... Podesitit specifičan scenario je u suštini složen inžinjerski problem, ne različit u principu sa scenarijom analize sprovedenim za prirodne opasnosti kao što su oluje i zemljotresi. Data dinamika izvora energije i geometriji rasipanja energije, ranjivost inžinjerske konstrukcije različitih tipova može se oceniti. Modelovanje studija različitih hipotetičkih terorističkih scenarija su u toku.

Za prirodne opasnosti, modelovanje opasnosti može biti tehnički i računarski zahtevno, ali modelari mogu da se uteše Ajnštajnovom izrekom da „ priroda može da bude suptilna ali ne zlonamerna“. Sa druge strane teroristi su oboje, i suptilni i zlonamerni. Dakle kako model opasnosti za terorizam može biti razvijen? Očigledno, drugačiji pristup je neophodan za tradicionalni redukcionistički „ odozdo prema gore“ pristup korišten za modeliranje neživog sveta inžinjerske fizike.

RAND predlog ( Ronfeldt i drugi., 2001) je da se fokusira na mrežu ponašanja terorističke organizacije i njen kapacitet da plati net-rat. Teorijski okvir za ovaj moderni modalitet konflikta postoji ( vidi npr. Valdrop 1992), koji pokazuje kako ključne karakteristike organizacione strukture složenih interakcija sistema se pojavljuju. Ova teroija je bila uspešna u protekloj dekadi u pionirskom kvantitativnom razumevanju mnogih aspekata društvenog ponašanja bioloških organizama. Nesumnjivo kao očigledne finije matematičke tačke teorije složenosti su začinjene net-rat praktičarima među krivičnim bratstvom, drogama, imigracijom i reketaškim krijumčarenjem. To je osnovni princip teorije kompleksnosti da karakteristike mreže nisu svesno oblikovane po njegovim komponenetama, već se pojavljuje sponatano iz njihovih individualnih akcija. U primeni široke ideje teorije kompleksnosti u sociološkom kontekstu, mora se voditi računa o ljudskom faktoru kao što su inteligencija i socijalna interakcija.

Kao što su socijolozi primetili ( Kenedi i drugi, 2001), kroz učenje iz iskustva i ugledajući se na uspešno ponašanje drugih, ljudi su u stanju da otkriju relativno optimalan obrazac stavova, verovanja i ponašanja. Za socijalne grupe u kojima pojedinci uče iz oponašanja i adaptiranja sa drugim članovima grupe, tako da postoji kolektivna obaveštajnost koja je geografski distribuirana. Ova kolektivno rasuta obaveštajnost je glavni aspekt terorističkih organizacija, Hidra- kao odlika koja ih čini nerazdovjivo još pretećim, moćnim i vrdajućim više nego usamljni teroristi.

Koncept izviđačkog roja je razvijen da se opišu populacije koja izlažu određene osnovne kolektivne obrasce ponašanja koje proizilaze ne toliko od vođstva pravca, već radije pojavljujući se iz akcija pojedinih članova. Socijalna insekt metafora je bila moćna alatka u istraživanju nekih suštinskih karakteristika društvenih organizacija, uključujući fleksibilnost, robusnost, distribuiran rad i autonomiju.

Iako je prvobitno razvijen u kontekstu ćelijskog robotskog sistema, pre svega paradigma za inteligenciju roja je kolonija mrava, koja ima izuzetnu sposobnost kolektivnog stizanja do rešenja skoro nerešvih matematičkih problema ( Bonabeu i drugi, 1999). Edvard Vilsonova duboka fascinacija sa načinom kojim masovno organizovano ponašanje mrav populacije može biti shvaćeno iz pojedinačnog mrav ponašanja, iscrtanog mu prema teoriji sociobiologije ( Vilson, 1975). Naravno mravi nisu ljudska bića. Mravi su genetski programirani da se posvete njihovim unapred dodeljenim zadatcima, da ubiju i da budu ubijeni pre kao automati, da budu pripremljeni da umru za koloniju kao što žive.

Ako ideja inteligencije roja se odnosi na bilo koju grupu ljudi, to bi bili revnosni i fanatični teroristi, povezani kao jedan od islamske obveznice bratstva, toliko apsolutni kao da su krvni srodnici. Takva teroristička grupa ne može biti adekvatno predstavljena kao skup pojedinačno orjentisanih pojedinaca, koja se zalaže za zajednički uzrok. Mnoge od njihovih specijalnih snaga obitava u neobičnom kvalitetu njihove kolektivne inteligencije roja, koja upravlja grupnim strahovitim sposobnostima izvršenja ekstrmnih aktova terora i bežanjem pre otkrivanja. Shodno tome, da bi smo shvatili prirodu terorističke opasnosti, njene prostorne i vremenske karakteristike, učestalnost i ozbiljnost napada, neophodno je razumeti strukturu terorističke organizacije.

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